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Pemilihan presiden Indonesia (Pilpres) 2019 secara luas disorot sebagai pertandingan 
ulang dua pemimpin populis antara Jokowi yang teknokratis dan Prabowo yang chauvi-
nistik. Setidaknya terdapat dua dimensi yang berkontribusi terhadap atmosfir populis 
pada Pilpres itu, yakni kondisi sosial-agama masyarakat dan penampilan pribadi calon 
presiden. Dengan mengacu pada dua hal tersebut, sebagian besar analis menyebut 
Prabowo lebih populis dibandingkan dengan Jokowi karena pidatonya yang energik dan 
wacana chauvinisnya. Namun, tak bisa dipungkiri, polarisasi di tingkat akar rumput 
sama tajamnya, baik di kalangan pendukung Jokowi maupun Prabowo. Lalu, sampai 
sejauh mana seseorang dengan sikap dan retorika populis yang halus seperti Jokowi 
dapat memiliki pendukung yang diwarnai sikap benci dan kondisi pasca-kebenaran 
yang mendalam. Studi ini menggarisbawahi media sosial dan agen perantara seba-
gai prinsip tambahan untuk pembentukan kubu yang semakin jelas di antara kedua 
pendukung. Dengan menggunakan analisis isi, penelitian ini mengungkap kekuatan 
populisme dan pasca-kebenaran dari sejumlah kecil sampel twit dan komentar untuk 
memahami bagaimana interaksi masyarakat dan para agen perantara dapat mem-
perdalam perpecahan antara para pendukung populis dan kondisi pasca-kebenaran. 
Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa, meskipun Jokowi dan Prabowo menampilkan gaya 
populis yang berbeda di pentas politik elektoral, penyampaian wacana yang memecah 
belah, provokasi, dan penghinaan marak dilakukan oleh agen perantara keduanya di 
media sosial.
Kata kunci: Pilpres 2019, media sosial, pasca-kebenaran, populisme, agen perantara
ABSTRACT
Indonesian 2019 presidential election was extensively highlighted as a populist rematch 
between the technocratic Jokowi and the chauvinist Prabowo. There were at least two 
dimensions that contributed to the existing populist atmosphere at the presidential 
election: the religio-social condition of the people and the personal appearance of the 
presidential candidates. By referring to the two factors, analysts predominantly men-
tioned that Prabowo was more populist than Jokowi due to his energetic rhetoric and 
chauvinist discourse. However, it is undeniable that the polarization at the grassroots 
level was equally vitriolic in both Jokowi and Prabowo supporters. To what extent, then, 
could a person with a subtle populist gesture and rhetoric such as Jokowi could have 
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vitriolic supporters and a deep post-truth condition. The research at hand underlines 
social media and middle-agents as additional tenets for the emerging entrenchment 
between the two supporters. Using content analysis, this research unpacks the popu-
lism and post-truth energy of a small sample of tweets and comments to comprehend 
how the interaction of the people and middle-agents could deepen populist cleavage 
and post-truth condition. This research found that, although Jokowi and Prabowo en-
visaged a different populist style at the front of the electoral stage, the articulation of 
divisive discourse, trolling, and mockery are equally sparkling from their middle-agents 
in social media.




The study of populism and post-truth was extensively growing in Indo-
nesia, at least, since the surge of conservative Muslims toppled down 
Basuki ‘Ahok’ Tjahaja Purnama, a candidate of 2017 Jakarta guber-
natorial election, and spiking at the immediate aftermath of the 2019 
Indonesia presidential election. The rally was a rematch of the 2014 
election between Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo, and Prabowo Subianto. The 
2019 election drew massive attention due to its novel social atmosphere 
and political maneuver. It was orchestrated on a well-digitized politi-
cal landscape and exhibited dense identity-based patronage. Various 
works of literature and commentaries (Hadiz 2018; Margiansyah 2019; 
Mietzner 2020; Putri 2019) highlighted the consolidation of Islamic 
movement by staging their respective middle-agents, namely Habib Ri-
zieq, Bachtiar Nasir, and many other whom sided with Prabowo. While 
at the same, Jokowi seemed to be excluded from a similar highlight, 
he was still identified as equally populist as Prabowo, but with less ag-
gressive rhetoric.
It is noticeable that Jokowi and Prabowo had different populist ma-
neuvers. Prabowo had to maintain the grassroots Islamic movement to 
attract Muslim voters. In consequence, the respective middle-agents 
must also frequently sow affective and emotional discourses to gather 
the mass cohesively. By contrast, Jokowi tied himself to Nahdlatul Ula-
ma (NU), one of the largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, and 
naming Ma’ruf Amin, a conservative cleric who gave a legal fatwa to 
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sentence Ahok, as his running mate. Hence, Jokowi had successfully 
saved a lion’s share of Muslims’ support. These populist maneuvers in-
fer different discursive structures. Prabowo’s middle-agents took blatant 
techniques, namely streets and mass gathering, as discourse catalysts 
which later echoed through social media. Meanwhile, Jokowi took a 
noiseless and what seemed to be a middle-agent-free method.
Many scholars were more energetic to underline the boldness of 
Prabowo’s rhetoric and discursive structure than Jokowi’s. The analy-
sis often relied on a comparative study of the verbal quality of both 
candidates (Hatherell and Welsh 2019; Margiansyah 2019). Populist 
characteristics such as romanticizing historical glory, chauvinistic ges-
ture, ostracizing ‘the other,’ anti-elite, invoking the heartland (imagined 
community), self-declaring as ‘the mouthpiece of the people’ (Engesser, 
Fawzi, and Larsson 2017) were hugely devoted to Prabowo more than 
Jokowi (Gueorguiev, Ostwald, and Schuler 2019; Margiansyah 2019; 
Mietzner 2020). In contrast, some observers noted Jokowi’s populism 
by addressing his non-verbal qualities, such as blusukan (unplanned 
visits), casual appearance, and closeness with the people in less devel-
oped areas, which echoed widely in social media (Hatherell and Welsh 
2019; Margiansyah 2019). However, it left two unanswered questions: 
first, to what extent can a candidate who had no blatant middle-agents 
and less verbal quality of populism earn his discursive catalyst and be 
sufficiently populist to be categorized as a populist. Second, if Jokowi 
lacked discursive catalysts, how could the post-truth condition in his 
capsule be adequately as solid as Prabowo’s.
Reflecting on the first question, the research at hand notes that the 
role of middle-agents as discourse catalysts in populism scholarship 
remains limited and is often scattered in its additional details. How-
ever, amid a vastly digitized political landscape, it is necessary to pay 
equal attention to both verbal and nonverbal quality to address how 
a political patron and his middle agents consolidate populism. In an 
interconnected world such as today, platforms allow non-verbal politi-
cal communications to replicate in a more decentralized way and give 
middle-agents less restrictive authority to proclaim themselves as the 
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‘mouthpiece of the people’ and nod toward certain affiliations. Given 
that, besides utilizing verbal analysis, it would also be fruitful to extend 
the threshold of nonverbal communications more than just appearance 
and relational performance between candidates and the people, but also 
include the middle-agents appearance and performative action in social 
occasions, as well as relational performances between candidates and 
middle-agents. Such attempts, related to the second question, aim to 
trace how the relationship between middle-agents and the people cre-
ates an affective basis for post-truth politics. Thus, instead of giving a 
detailed account of populist parameters and identification, this research 
focuses on how the role of middle-agents in consolidating populism in 
online space and how their direction could provide a basis for a post-
truth condition during the Indonesia 2019 presidential election. 
R ESEA RCH METHOD
This research embarks as a qualitative study of content analysis. Con-
tent analysis is not only beneficial to comprehend how the internet and 
social media interact with political actions, regime transformations, and 
digital control (Bradshaw and Howard 2018; Herring 2009), but also 
helps to highlight how power flows through narratives, unpack manipu-
lative interests, and so forth. The study of populism in content analy-
sis is slightly growing due to the increasing trend of populist message 
distribution in the digital space (Blassnig et al. 2018; Engesser, Fawzi, 
and Larsson 2017). The attempts ranged from longitudinal research, 
employing a massive amount of content scrapping in a selected period 
(Blassnig et al. 2018; Ernst et al. 2017; Hameleers and Vligenthart 2019), 
to critical analysis of content narrative (Engesser et al. 2017; Sengul 
2019). However, both methods have their pros and cons. Longitudinal 
research is more suitable for revealing macroscopic political patterns in 
a certain period or comparing political trends in two or more countries, 
while critical content analysis remains prospective to capture close-up 
panorama between interrelated elements and actors.
The research at hand collects a small sample of tweets and com-
ments from both structural and non-structural politicians as well as 
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ordinary citizens from February 11, 2018, to April 15, 2019, a period 
where the heat of electoral contestation intensified in Indonesia’s politi-
cal climate. To unpack its substance and relational position, this study 
utilizes a few seminal insights from previous research, such as populist 
communication opportunities and features (Ernst et al. 2017), as a piv-
otal point to reveal further relation between post-truth populism.
CONCEP TUA L FR A MEWOR K
Populist Communication and Post-Truth
Although the research at hand recognizes that there is no final concept 
of populism, it is necessary to mention the minimal definition and its 
recent development. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) argued that popu-
lism was a thin-centered ideology that consisted of antagonistic relations 
between the ‘pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt’ elites and saw that politics 
should be the expression of the general will of the people. However, 
by considering diverse political contexts and developments in different 
hemispheres, scholars have put forward the key elements of populism 
(ideology, actor, and ‘the people’) into a more non-dichotomous nuance 
(Postill 2018; Sengul 2019; Waisbord 2018). For example, the variety of 
ideology has expanded from left-right to left-center-right (Mietzner 2020; 
Postill 2018). However, a set of ideological preferences in a particular 
country affects the characteristics of populism. In Europe and the US, 
left and right-wing populists tend to swing their political narratives on 
religious, racial, economic, and native-immigrant sovereignty issues. 
Countries under a crime-ridden condition such as the Philippines, Bra-
zil, or Mexico are inclined to use the ‘populist of fear’ (Chevigny 2003). 
Thus, by reinforcing politics of hope and anxiety, Rodrigo Duterte won 
the 2016 Philippines election through ‘penal populism’ (Curato 2017). 
In Indonesia, theocratic and technocratic political tones represent right-
wing populism and centrist populism in the 2019 presidential election 
due to the vanishing leftist movement for decades (Postill 2018; Mi-
etzner 2020).
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Given the diversity of ideology and cultural capital, the antagonistic 
currency of populism also drew contextual roots. Some Western observ-
ers pointed to the failure of the neo-liberal system in providing a healthy 
democratic climate amid technological, demographic, racial, and eco-
nomic challenges as a catalyst for populist antagonism (Baron 2018; 
Gerbaudo 2018). Meanwhile, others insisted that the antagonistic lo-
calities of populism consist of the complex entanglement of economic, 
cultural, existential, and other factors which are prospective for further 
explorations and irreducible for neo-liberal’s failure (Postill 2018). Thus, 
criminals might be treated as ‘the other’ who threaten ‘the people’ for 
populist actors in a crime-ridden country, where social security becomes 
a prospective issue (Valiquette and Su 2018).
In the United States, for example, there is a clash of values between 
older people, particularly whites—which revolve around jobs, economic 
growth, and other things that people living in the Great Depression 
and war era care about—and the values of multiculturalism, cosmo-
politanism, and any sort of progressive agendas among American young 
adults. This collision allowed Trump to antagonize non-white citizens 
as villains who undermine traditional American values (Norris 2017). 
In Indonesia, the antagonistic currency of populism occurred from the 
long-standing, politically maintained racial and religious sentiments 
surrounding the dichotomy of Muslims against non-Muslims, natives 
(pribumi) against non-natives (especially those of Chinese descent), na-
tionalism against communism, and Islamism against liberalism (Bour-
chier 2016; Kimura 2017; Tirtosudarmo and Hadi 2019).
In its localities, populism also has myriad forms of communications 
to configure its triadic elements (the elites, the people, and the others). 
However, it can be characterized by either its agency or political status. 
The agency status points to whether a particular communicative ac-
tion is orchestrated by humans, non-humans (bots), or a combination 
of both. Meanwhile, the political status refers to the social and politi-
cal capital of human actors have in consolidating the general will of 
the people: they can either be structural or non-structural politicians. 
Observers, as mentioned in the introduction, are favored to the direct 
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top-down communication between high-ranking political actors and 
the people for the account of populism’s triadic elements, while the 
intermediary positions of non-structural politicians are rarely included 
in the account. In fact, non-structural politicians also take a significant 
role in condensing grassroots consolidation and elevating electoral affin-
ity for high-rank structural politicians. Thus, the promotor of populist 
discourse may involve comedians, books, bots, community leaders, low 
or middle-ranking politicians, and any sort of actors that ideologically 
or culturally fits with the enclaves of the people, the others, and the 
elites in a given society (see Kusumo and Hurriyah 2018; Toronto Star 
2012; Viner 2016).
These multi-dimensional communications are inherently part of a 
bigger frame of Chadwick’s hybrid media system where the net and real-
world mutually fed and echoed each other, whether in formal forums 
such as social media, campaign rally, or in the casual occasions such 
as religious altars, face-to-face conversations, slums or squares (Postill 
2018). This, however, points at the emerging trend of interdimensional 
experience in which people comprehend and manifest their lives and 
thoughts in both offline and online worlds as inseparable reality (e.g., 
Kalpokas 2019; Tirtosudarmo and Hadi 2019). The practice depends on 
the populist’ ability to recognize discursive and political opportunities 
in the respective country. Discursive opportunity refers to any societal 
concern over ideology, culture, economics, or any critical affairs that are 
deemed to have a disruptive impact when crafted in a communicative 
message (Engesser, Fawzi, and Larsson 2017), even though such impact 
would not be impactful when it is not supported by the speaker’s politi-
cal position. In other words, political opportunity determines the pos-
sible directions for navigating the populist messages (Engesser, Fawzi, 
and Larsson 2017).
At the same time, populist communication features, namely ostraciz-
ing the others, invoking the heartland or historical figures, emphasizing 
the sovereignty of the people, and taking an anti-elites/establishment 
stance (Engesser, Fawzi, and Larsson 2017), may become parts of a 
larger attempt to put public feelings and opinions in a game of impul-
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sive interdimensional experience. These disruptive features encourage 
divisive effects in society and configure the logical basis for its an-
tagonistic political partisanship. Later, the accumulation of personal 
emotions sublimed into ‘affect,’ in which individuals engaged in a will 
of connectedness with a particular group and internalizing its cultural 
and ideological norms, worldview, and frame of reference, where emo-
tional alignment and discursive appropriation take place (Dӧveling, 
Harju, and Sommer 2018). By the existence of an interdimensional 
experience, personal emotions and communal affects not only circulate 
across the spatio-temporal and societal boundaries, but also maintain 
their continuation, reconfiguration, and contagion (Dӧveling, Harju, 
and Sommer 2018).
Amid a digital-savvy political landscape, populism received a propi-
tious communication space. Populist’ truth commitment, which stands 
against scientific and liberal paradigms (Waisbord 2018), is mostly be-
stowed by the digital sphere in obtaining disputed arbitrary interpreta-
tions among political elites and the competing masses. Hence, facts, 
opinions, and misinformation have become subjective artifacts in which 
ideological and cultural pre-cognition operate in individuals and com-
munal domains. This line is inherently part of where post-truth had 
taken a role in populist communication. It does not mean that popu-
lism and post-truth are solely embedded in textual relativity or social 
constructivism (Waisbord 2018). However, it engaged in a broader nu-
ance that consists of complex combinations of textual fragility of social 
media contents, personal emotions, communal effects, computational 
manipulations, and cognitive biases (Gracia 1995; Lewandowsky, Ecker, 
and Cook 2017; McIntyre 2018; Wooley and Howard 2019). The deterio-
rating democracy accompanied by the growing digitalization of media 
smoothens populism in navigating their narratives, provides political 
meaning, and constructs foundational will against the elites (Waisbord 
2018).
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R ESULT A ND DISCUSSION
Populist Agency in Indonesia
Although the initial roots of populism in Indonesia have been noticed 
since before New Order (Hadiz 2016), the embryo of populism was ac-
quired significant development after the fall of the New Order in 1998 
(reformasi). Reformasi would later determine the political and discur-
sive structure of Indonesian populism motifs. Shortly before reformasi 
erupted, the Islamic tarbiyyah movement, at the same time, was at its 
high surge due to the accommodation of Suharto’s rule (Fuad 2020). In 
1970–1998, the tarbiyyah movement predominantly targeted educated 
youth groups by programming Bina Masjid Kampus and Latihan Mu-
jahid Dakwah under the director of the Indonesian Islamic Dakwah 
Council (DDII) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) (Hilmy 2010).
The tarbiyyah movement taught their cadres four basic principles: 
having a well-established basic Islamic knowledge, upholding Islamic 
attitude and ethical principle (akhlaq), depriving themselves of idola-
trous activities, and disconnecting themselves from anything related to 
enemies of Islam (Fuad 2020). As few decades went by, the movement’s 
cadres have been distributed in many strategic social positions, allowing 
them to promote Islamic narrative in broader-cum-authoritative chan-
nels such as educational, social, and civil institutions. Some notable 
alumni, like Salim Segaf Al-Jufri and Anis Matta, are holding strategic 
structural political positions, which would later contribute to the rise 
of Indonesian populism in recent years.
One of the major concerns for the tarbiyyah movement is that Islam 
and politics are inseparable. Therefore, their struggles aimed to cap-
ture the formalization of Islamic values in Indonesia’s political system 
(Fuad 2020). The tarbiyyah movement believed that the established 
Suharto regime was corrupt and un-Islamic (Fuad 2020). This view was 
a response to Suharto’s long-standing business with the military and 
tycoons, who were mostly Javanese and Chinese. The racial division, 
pribumi and non-pribumi, that re-emerged in the 1970s made Chinese 
people considered as migrants (Tsai 2011). Given that historical back-
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ground, the Chinese were often perceived as Suharto’s cronies who have 
widened the economic gap between natives and non-natives (Tirto-
sudarmo and Hadi 2019). As Kimura (2017) confirmed, the sentiment 
towards Chinese people has not only crystallized from the 1990s to the 
early 2000s but has persisted to the present day. Some latest research 
(Lim 2017; Nadzir, Seftiani, and Permana 2019) even shows that this 
sentiment evolved through myriad narratives in the digital space (Lim 
2017; Nadzir, Seftian, and Permana 2019).
After reformasi erupted, the tarbiyyah movement, in which the mem-
bers were mainly occupied under the PKS banner, evolved in a more 
distributive way. The fall of Suharto allowed the spirit of unity to spring 
in various concerns. Thus, the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’ah Communication 
Forum (FKAWJ), and many similar organizations burst on to the scene 
to pursue their Islamic agenda and express their freedom of speech and 
union. Ahead of the 1999 general election, the revivalist party such 
as the Crescent Star Party (PBB) was also established (Hilmy 2010; 
Platzdasch 2009).
Although the political climate in the aftermath of reformasi tended 
to be more democratic, this does not mean that it was free from Suhar-
to’s influence. Suharto gave way to two sentiments that would continue 
to this day (Mietzner 2013). First, Suharto’s New Order successfully 
demonized the leftist-egalitarian movement and any unions or grass-
roots activism. Second, chasmic partisan and personal cleavages within 
society make it inhospitable for leftist activism to be reborn.
Nevertheless, those historical outlines lead to an outcome of dis-
cursive and political opportunity. For discursive opportunity, it gives: 
first, no discursive rival for Islamism except for nationalism. Hence, 
the Islamist movements flourished at an unprecedented pace, accom-
panying the deepening nationalism among the state’s elites. Second, 
Suharto’s leftist ‘ghost’ propaganda persists until this day and is politi-
cally exploitable, whether for the incumbent or grassroots organization 
leader. Third, sympathy for leftist or egalitarian discourses often faces 
resistance, either from the established regime or from Islamist groups. 
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In other words, today’s political discourse was deeply rooted in Indo-
nesian political history. It gives long-standing tangled memory, affect, 
imagery, longing, and hope for society and political elites to project 
today’s concerns and agendas.
Besides, it cast the pattern for the structural and non-structural po-
litical opportunities in the 2019 presidential rally. In the Islamist line, 
many notable tarbiyyah alumni held influential positions in today’s 
socio-political affairs, either in structural or non-structural ones. Salim 
Segaf Aljufri, for instance, served as the 2015–2020 PKS’ Majlis Syura 
(the consultative council) leader. However, the position is not always 
linear between an individual’s background and an organization’s ideol-
ogy. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, a 64-year-old lawyer, has since 2015 became 
the chairman of the Crescent Star Party (PBB), one of the Islamist 
party. A prominent organization for the 2016 mass rally against Ahok, 
GNPF-MUI, was once headed by a prolific preacher, Bachtiar Nasir, 
before Yusuf Martak, an ex-Vice President of PT Energi Mega Persada 
(Raditya 2019), took his position in 2017.
At the grassroots level, the flourishing Islamism influenced the grow-
ing number of young preachers with an incredible number of social 
media followers. Some of them displayed Islamist undertow in their 
social media accounts and did not hesitate to perpetrate political en-
dorsement and disagreement during the 2019 presidential election. Felix 
Siauw, a preacher of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia with millions of followers 
in multiple social media platforms, for instance, consistently advocates 
the formalization of a khilafah (caliphate) government and criticizes the 
established regime (Weng 2018) in social media, accompanying HTI 
spokesperson Ismail Yusanto in handling the public discourse through 
mainstream media. Those, however, were the coalescing names sur-
rounding the vibrant-cum-charismatic leader, Habib Rizieq Shihab, of 
Islamic Defender Front (FPI)—a vital token for Prabowo’s presidential 
rally beside his financial supporters, business moguls such as Hasyim 
Djodjohadikusumo and Sandiaga Uno (Mietzner 2020).
In contrast to Prabowo’s group of supporters, which are mostly com-
posed of religious and political elites, the secular nationalist camp has 
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a more nuanced spectrum of political opportunity, stretching from re-
ligious, political, and cultural elites. During the aftermath of Aksi Bela 
Islam in 2016 to the 2019 election, NU cadres widely filled strategic 
positions. Ma’ruf Amin, who would later be named as Jokowi’s running 
mate, was the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) leader at that time. 
The nomination of Jokowi’s vice-president candidate was also orbiting 
around names such as Muhammad Romahurmuziy and Muhaimin Is-
kandar, who was chairmen of the United Development Party (PPP) and 
the National Awakening Party (PKB), respectively. In addition, among 
the non-structural actors who backed Jokowi are Candra Malik, a cul-
tural enthusiast who followed one of NU’s most respected figure, Habib 
Luthfi Yahya, in endorsing Jokowi; and Mukti Ali Qusyairi, who is the 
author Ulama Bertutur Jokowi (2018), a book that serves as a counternar-
rative for allegations against Jokowi (Defianti 2018). Meanwhile, from 
established parties, there were names such as Airlangga Hartanto of 
Golkar; media tycoons and party leaders, Surya Paloh (Nasdem party) 
and Hary Tanoesodibjo of Perindo also gave their support for Jokowi 
through the nationalist group.
These Islamist and nationalist political opportunity structures reflect 
the ideological position of populism in Indonesia, whether moguls stand 
behind both sides structurally or not. Following the line, the 2019 presi-
dential campaigns are notoriously known to be funded by natural indus-
try oligarchs (Morse 2019). According to Prabowo and Sandiaga Uno’s 
campaign manager, 98 percent of their electoral fund came from the 
businesses of the two candidates (Debora 2019). Sandiaga Uno provided 
$8.1 million, or 61 percent of total campaign expenditure, from his en-
ergy, mining, agriculture, and infrastructure businesses. While Jokowi-
Ma’ruf received approximately $9.2 million, or two of third of the total 
electoral budget, from shadowy funding, Perkumpulan Golfer (Golfer’s 
Club), and other names such as Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan (Morse 2019). 
Accordingly, five tenets can be pointed out from Prabowo and 
Jokowi’s political agencies. First, besides earning electoral affinity from 
oligarchic support, both candidates also used non-structural agents to 
generate social support by benefiting from the existing feeling of crisis 
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from the respective groups. Second, while Jokowi used diverse non-
structural agents ranging from a cultural enthusiast, prominent ulama, 
book authors, and so forth, Prabowo had a smaller spectrum of non-
structural agents that mostly are religious figures. Third, these layers 
created different realities between grassroots political perceptions and 
elite political agenda. These contrasting realities, arguably, reflected 
the ideological orbit where Islamism and nationalism are undertaken 
by oligarchic interest. Fourth, the middle-agents bridged the grassroots 
political perception to fit with the elites’ political agenda. Fifth, this did 
not only exemplify that the political elites were indebted to a particular 
community patron (Hadiz 2018) but were also indebted to the larger 
strands of non-structural agents, especially the online ones.
Online Environment of Populism in Indonesia
Indonesia’s online sphere has been a fertile ground for nefarious deeds 
since its emergence. Factors such as poor media literacy, poor-designed 
regulations, and a lack of democratic commitments are key factors in 
point (Paterson 2019). According to the 2017 APJII Survey, there are 
143.26 million internet users in Indonesia, with 41.55% utilized online 
platforms to consume religious information, while the other 50.26% 
chose to read political information. This evidence shows that the arable 
prospect for emotional exploitation in Indonesia’s political communica-
tion has been laid before the 2019 presidential election.
In pertinence to that, the Ministry of Communication confirmed 
that there were approximately 26 of 38 blocked websites that spread 
religious and political misinformation in 2018. However, the response 
against that digital malaise remains limited around bureaucratic preven-
tions, namely: Gerakan Literasi Nasional by the Ministry of Culture and 
Education; which encourage the national cyber authority, Badan Siber 
dan Sandi Nasional (BSSN), to curb malicious contents; and cooperate 
with MUI to release fatwa against misinformation and hoax (Arwendria 
and Oktavia 2019). More substantial threats such as a lack of democratic 
commitment, computational propaganda, and blatant populist rhetoric 
(Engesser, Fawzi, and Larsson 2017; Margiansyah 2019) were beyond 
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the reach of those preventions and remained entangled until the voting 
day. Consequently, political parties and private contractors became the 
main conductor for bots and human agents in engineering the media 
sphere in Indonesia. The works of these manipulative agents consisted 
of boosting support for the favored political affiliation, attacking their 
opponents, and creating polarization of public opinion (Bradshaw and 
Howard 2019).
Blatant misinformation from misleading sources and implicit ‘truthi-
ness’ from political actors may tap the individual beliefs and feed public 
emotions. Thus, even before the election day, the problem of Indone-
sia’s online sphere was that the preventive policies remained prone to 
the practices of broadcasting misinformation, implicit post-truth, and 
antagonistic populist rhetoric. Prabowo, Jokowi, and their agencies are 
the cases in point. For example, the incumbent plays two paradoxi-
cal roles in the electoral game: verbally condemning the practice of 
misinformation while at the same time politically practicing media 
manipulation. In July 2018, Jokowi urged the people to use their ballots 
wisely and be aware of online manipulations (Ratnasari 2018), but on 
April 16, 2019, a day before the election, the excessive force of buzzers 
is deployed on Twitter, amplifying Jokowi’s tweet (Fahmi 2019).
Similarly, the opposition was also on account doing the same thing. 
On April 15, 2019, Prabowo’s coalition parties told the public to avoid 
misinformation mindfully (Putri 2019). However, the day after the mes-
sage was broadcast, a few of Prabowo-affiliated influencers success-
fully created a pseudo-organic conversation on Twitter, beating Jokowi’s 
buzzer force in the level of interaction (Fahmi 2019). Besides compu-
tational engineering, both candidates also exhibit religious discourses 
to attract their respective supporters. However, the implications went 
too far.
In the short period before the election, Jokowi embarked to Mecca 
for Umrah. A photo of him entering Ka’bah was uploaded on his social 
media. Similarly, Prabowo also posted his religious activity on Twitter to 
celebrate the election day (see figure 1). Since the polarization among 
the public kept sharpening from the 2016 demonstrations against Ahok 
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to the date of Jokowi and Prabowo’s pious tweets were uploaded, they 
could not escape from interpretative polemics among the public. The 
post-truth condition occurred from the dissent of beliefs, not from a 
dichotomy of fact versus emotion (d’Ancona 2017; McIntyre 2018).
Figure 1. Jokowi and Prabowo’s Tweet for Performative Religious Discourse
Following Maurer’s (2016) postulation, when one is involved in political 
practice, the one’s verbal or non-verbal activities are always bounded 
in political interpretations linking a set of the cultural or ideological 
history of his or her audience to figure out the respective performance, 
either glaring rhetoric, pretentious deed or promise, or a subtle body 
gesture or visual appearance. The tweets at hand and Maurer’s line 
are not the point for the postmodernist version of post-truth, where 
reality is created in an individual’s mind (d’Ancona 2017; Fischer 2020; 
McIntyre 2018). Instead, they refer to the social constructivism version 
of post-truth, where different ‘beliefs’ competing for a reality outside 
the mind (Fischer 2020). Figure 2 shows that the competing beliefs 
among supporters are an inherent part of these religious tweets: Jokowi 
and Prabowo supporters believed that their individual beliefs are true 
and that their opponent was wrong. By uploading the portrayal of sa-
cred and pious moments, both candidates represented a contestation in 
earning electoral affinity from Muslim voters, despite inviting vitriolic 
comments from the opposing supporters.
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Figure 2. Comments from Jokowi and Prabowo’s Tweet in Figure 1
Another pious occasion of Jokowi and Prabowo also took place a few 
days before the election day. On April 13, 2019, Jokowi met Habib 
Luthfi Yahya and KH Maimoen Zubair before his campaign rally in 
Gelora Bung Karno Stadium (Kuwando 2019). The video of Habib 
Luthfi Yahya welcoming Jokowi in Gelora Bung Karno Stadium, which 
was uploaded on April 14, 2019, by Candra Malik received 7,400 views 
(figure 3). Similarly, on April 13, 2019, a tweet from Dahnil Anzar 
Simanjuntak showed the photos of Prabowo and Sandiaga Uno visit-
ing a prominent television preacher, KH Abdullah Gymnastiar, widely 
known as Aa Gym, amassing 2,600 likes. In these tweets, the political 
interests and religion as a social capital interacted with each other and 
exemplified how the middle agents manage their positions to convert 
their social capital for the desired political outcome. By displaying reli-
gio-political affiliation of their patron, both influencers directed their 
audience where to align.
Worth noting that there was a different communication style be-
tween Malik and Anzar in guiding the audience to a particular political 
affiliation. In addition to being NU’s influential cultural icon, Malik 
placed himself as a Habib Luthfi Yahya student. In other words, he 
showed his audience that he was an internal part of a religious commu-
nity, not a part of the political elites. In contrast to Malik, Anzar placed 
his position under the banner of the political elites, not behind the 
lines of Aa Gym. Subsequently, their affiliative position determined the 
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discourse that ideologically plausible to feed the beliefs of the partisans. 
By referring to Habib Luthfi Yahya as an authoritative figure, Malik 
implied that Jokowi was the chosen political side for NU. Meanwhile, 
the devotional process from Aa Gym to Anzar’s patron illustrated that 
Prabowo and Sandi were virtuous candidates for the presidency and 
vice presidency. Both Malik and Anzar employed the argumentum ab 
auctoritate strategy in their religious discourse. The difference was that 
Malik tended to emphasize Habib Luthfi Yahya’s charisma, while Anzar 
was inclined to highlight Aa Gym’s virtuous advice as a representative 
testimony of the Muslims.
Figure 3.  Malik and Anzar’s Tweets; Jokowi and Prabowo Meet Different Religious Leader.
The examples above show that the affiliative border for the audience is 
disciplined by the charisma of a religious figure. Religious influencers, 
however, play a role as the coordinator to put the people under a clear 
community demarcation. Furthermore, the encounter of religion and 
politics has made spirituality embedded in populist online communi-
cation. Then, the notion of freedom of political choice expands into 
a fear of betraying a religious leader. This puts politics no longer be 
based on scientific evidence but instead based on religion as a source 
of alternative truth, where believing in non-empirical claims credited 
as part of faith is emphasized (McDermott 2019). Thus, recognizing 
which candidate the respective religious leader is inclined to may af-
fect how the audience calculates the afterlife consequence of a politi-
cal preference. In other words, what, where, and whom from a subtle 
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movement of political safari may impact the affective basis and logic 
of the people. Influencers, regardless of their religious, political, or 
educational background, disseminate populist messages or viewpoints 
directly or indirectly on Twitter by occasional will. This perhaps is the 
development of where the echo of populist zeitgeist migrates gradually 
from conventional media (Hameleers and Vligenthart 2019) to the digi-
tal one with its myriad forms and facilities of communications.
Additionally, trolling and populist communication feature takes 
place beside the middle agents religious rhetoric in endorsing a presi-
dential candidate. Figure 4 envisages that middle-agents employ a sort 
of intertwined strategy of post-truth and populist communication, like 
preferring to use facts that support their beliefs or political stance; mock-
ery; and emphasizing people’s will. As Prabowo’s endorser, Anzar’s tweet 
contained ‘emphasizing people’s will’ feature to sharpen the news’s im-
pact on public opinion. While in Jokowi’s camp, Denny Siregar added 
a simple caption of mockery on a news headline he captured. In line 
with their difference in news preference, both Anzar and Siregar’s cap-
tions also exhibited different framing. Anzar portrayed his tweet as a 
serious matter, while Siregar tended to trivialize the issue at hand. They 
may not interact intentionally on Twitter, but their impact on public 
opinion may be severe. Both tweets led to the entrenching belief that 
each candidate committed electoral fraud. (See figure 5).
Figure 4. Denny Siregar and Dahnil Anzar Citing Mainstream Media News
93PATRONIZING THE MASS
In relevance to that, the atmosphere of moral sentiment was strongly ar-
ticulated in the reply section (figure 5). Supporters of Jokowi in Siregar’s 
tweets and Prabowo’s supporters in Anzar’s tweets expressed myriad 
narratives and reasoning to maintain their belief from unfavorable facts. 
However, the audience’s response ranged from conspiratorial analysis, 
incitement, mockery, and even pious grievance. These replies represent 
the mixture of various strands of emotions on how each side debunks 
their opponent. In the case at hand, post-truth emerged neither from 
hoaxes nor fake news but rather from tailored facts and fragmented 
ideologies. Although the middle-agents cannot be blamed for the entire 
situation, they remain hugely contributive to the occurring atmosphere. 
Connotative and denotative meaning in a news headline, where the 
news is reposted, who posts the news, and what captions are written, are 
a kind of determinant factors whether the post-truth condition may take 
place in an audience, in addition to the ability of the populist actors to 
ignite affiliative emotions and throw fragmented meanings (Engesser 
et al. 2017; Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann 2017; Waisbord 2018).
Figure 5. Comments from Siregar and Anzar’s Tweet
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Siregar and Anzar’s tweets exemplify that, first, mainstream media can 
neutrally spark, embolden, or legitimize the populist messages of mid-
dle agents (Blassnig et al. 2018; Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann 2017). 
Second, although the middle agents’ tweet may contain no populist 
communication features, other forms of technique, namely mockery 
and trolling, may take place as its substitute. Third, populist commu-
nication feature such as ‘ostracizing others,’ ‘emphasizing people’s will,’ 
and ‘invoking the heartland’ is eminent in the reply section. However, a 
similar style is also prominent within structural politicians’ tweets with 
broader employment of affective basis and ideological affiliation, as the 
following transcript shows:
PBB will act as Islamic opposition forces, defend Islam, the nation, 
and the state from bankruptcy and its downfall! [Original: PBB akan 
tampil sebagai kekuatan oposisi Islam, membela Islam dan membela 
bangsa dan negara dari kebangkrutan dan keruntuhan!]. (Mahendra 
2018a)
During the pre-election times, Crescent Star Party stands as one of 
the leading supporters of Aksi Bela Islam serial demonstrations. PBB’s 
leader, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, exemplified the populist feature of ‘ad-
vocate for the people’. Mahendra played a polarized role between ‘the 
Muslim’ (the ‘pure’ people) and ‘the corrupt elite,’ which was framed 
as a devastating threat to Islam’s sustainability. Furthermore, he called 
for defense on Islam with a broad segmentation range:
The jargon of the fight for the oppressed is our platform. We fight for 
the Muslim community and anyone who is wronged and repressed 
by the regime. We do not theorize; we act! [Original: Jargon pembe-
laan terhadap kaum terzalimi adalah platform kami. Kami membela 
umat Islam dan membela golongan mana saja yang terzalimi dan 
tertindas oleh penguasa. Kami tidak berteori, tapi kami bertindak 
di lapangan dengan tindakan nyata]. (Mahendra 2018b)
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Another way to engage the audience to an emotional affiliation is by 
bringing up historical figures or the motherland that longs for glory. 
The use of these figures is to promote the convergence of a context, in 
which the imagination of ‘the ideal’ and ‘the utopia’ or ‘the nonideal’ 
and ‘the dystopia’ influences the audience’s status-quo perceptions. 
Consequently, it might affect the audience’s political stance. As Fahri 
Hamzah tweeted:
Our founding fathers wanted themselves to be the manifestation of 
the general will of this country. Bung Karno, for example, claimed 
himself as The Mouthpiece of the Indonesian People. [Original: 
Para pemimpin kita dulu, ingin dirinya menjadi penjelmaan dari 
seluruh kehendak rakyat negeri ini. Bung Karno misalnya, menyebut 
dirinya sebagai Penyambung Lidah Rakyat Indonesia.]. (Hamzah 
2018)
A similar effect also applies when the populists use anti-elite or anti-
legal elite articulation:
#SupportYIMPunishKPU; Do not let your hatred against a certain 
group makes you inflict injustice upon them. PBB is my party; the 
star and crescent is my banner [#DukungYIMPidanakanKPU; Jan-
ganlah kebencianmu terhadap satu golongan, membuatmu berlaku 
tidak adil... PBB partaiku..Bulan bintang panjiku]. (Hasan 2018)
Hasan’s tweet emphasized the true representation of the people’s will. 
The tweet expressed a sense of delegitimization of a state-operated in-
stitution. Hasan calls for the people to delegitimize the Election Com-
mission (KPU). He believed that the established elite had derogated 
the people’s will.
Transcripts of structural politicians’ tweets exhibit a sort of affective 
grammar referring to Islamism. Glittering generalizations, institution-
al name-calling, and claiming as the people’s mouthpiece foster not 
only emotional engagement but also embolden the way how Muslims 
are supposedly treated. Following Engesser et al.’s (2017) words, “the 
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fragmentation can be an ‘inherent incompleteness’ of populism that 
encourages the individual social media user to be able to complement 
fragments of populist ideology with various additional ideological ele-
ments and tailor it to her or his specific political attitudes.”
CONCLUSION
Middle-agents have had a strong influence in creating a populist at-
mosphere during the 2019 presidential election. Their social capital 
and ability to optimize digital media gave resonance for the public to 
comprehend bigger discourses that fit with their preferred ideology. 
Some of the structural and non-structural politicians spread pious but 
fragmenting, taunting, and conspiratorial messages to seduce the audi-
ence into a particular stance of ideology, political attitude, or arbitrary 
interpretation. This left inconclusive or even vicious perceptions of real-
ity among each partisan. Thus, although each presidential candidate 
might only show populist rhetoric, gesture, or appearance, it seems that 
online interactions among the masses and influencers ignite a post-
truth condition, not just because of the emergence of tailored facts, 
but also due to the affiliative influence among individual social media 
users. Additionally, although Prabowo and Jokowi have contrasting ma-
neuvers in the offline world, their middle-agents had equal power to 
spark moral sentiments in the online space.
Thus, it is important to revisit the notion that Jokowi and Prabowo 
barely received their populist status on their character and political 
gestures (Margiansyah 2019). The status is credited to the result of the 
work of their middle-agents and the spread of online communication. In 
other words, instead of blaming the candidates for the existing populist 
condition, it seems that the middle-agents and online activities con-
tribute more to the current populist climate in Indonesia—in addition 
to the long-standing religious, socio-cultural inequality, and oligarchic 
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